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rate regime and companies￿ exchange rate exposure for a sample of non-
financial Brazilian companies during the period from 1996 to 2002. I find that the 
number of companies exposed to fluctuations on the exchange rate is much 
higher than the number in developed countries; about 40% of the companies are 
exposed to fluctuations on the exchange rate. Moreover, the results show that, 
on average, Brazilian companies do not benefit from depreciations of the home 
currency, evidencing their vulnerability to movements in the exchange rate. I also 
find that companies￿ exchange exposure varies considerably across the 
exchange rate regime. The results show that the number of companies exposed 
during the floating exchange rate regime is much lower than under the fixed one. 
The paper gives evidence that this reduction in companies￿ exchange rate 
exposure comes from the fact that under the floating exchange rate regime, not 
only do companies currency derivatives more extensively to reduce their foreign 
exchange rate exposure, but they also reduce the currency mismatch in their 
balance sheets.  
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  Recent financial crises
2 showed that emerging countries are extremely 
vulnerable to sudden swings in international capital flows. In these countries, 
commonly, periods of relative tranquility, characterized by substantial capital 
inflows and real GDP growth, are followed by periods when capital flows abroad, 
and output plummets
3. In some countries, such crises lead not only to economic 
downturns but also to social unrest. Although there is a consensus among 
economists that emerging markets should take measures to reduce their external 
vulnerability, there is no agreement about the role of the choice of the exchange 
rate regime in this matter. At the center of this debate is the fact that due to the 
widespread problem of the dollarization of liabilities, depreciations of the home 
currency in emerging markets would cause a collapse in companies￿ balance 
sheets, leading to a fall in output
4. Therefore, one mechanism through which the 
choice of the exchange rate regime could affect countries￿ vulnerability would be 
to exert influence on corporate financial policies. 
One hypothesis in the international finance literature is that fixed exchange 
rate regimes would increase countries￿ vulnerability by leading companies to 
disregard the exchange rate risk, biasing their borrowing towards foreign 
currency denominated debt
5, and/or reducing their hedging activities. According 
to this hypothesis, floating regimes would help to reduce countries￿ vulnerability 
by inducing creditors and debtors to take seriously their exchange rate exposure. 
On the other hand, the so-called ￿original sin￿
6 theory argues that, independently 
of the exchange rate regime, emerging countries will always be vulnerable to 
external shocks. There will always be a currency mismatch on companies￿ 
balance sheets, since domestic companies would never be allowed to borrow in 
the domestic currency, and most of their revenues come from domestic activities. 
In a similar way, Calvo and Mishkin (2003) argue that the construction of healthy 
macroeconomic institutions would be the key to countries￿ macroeconomic 
stability, and the choice of the exchange rate regime would likely be of second 
order importance to alleviate countries￿ external vulnerability
7.  
Since the theoretical literature has not reached a consensus, at the end of 
the day, the answer for this question should be empirical, as pointed out by 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), ’’...gathering survey (and other) data on 
hedged and unhedged exposures and analyzing their determinants should be a 
high priority for academics’’
 8. This paper tries to shed light on this question by 
                                                 
2 East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999,2002), Turkey (2000), and Argentina (2001). 
3 This is called in the international finance literature - the sudden-stop problem. 
4 Even among politicians, there is a strong concern that the high levels of foreign denominated debt led the country to 
be vulnerable to external shocks. ￿It is very important to everybody to realize that Brazil is still a vulnerable 
economy￿ We are vulnerable because we owe a lot, and a fraction of this debt is expressed in dollars.￿ Luis Inacio 
Lula da Silva, Brazilian President, 03/30/2004, O Globo. 
5 Dooley (1997), Burnside et al (1999), Schneider and Tornell (2003), Corsetti (1999), among others. 
6 Expression created by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). 
7 The authors consider the possibility that there might be a causal relationship between the choice of exchange rate 
regime and the improvement of economic institutions. 
8 Although slim, the literature on the relationship between the choice of the exchange rate and countries￿ vulnerability 
shows mixed results. Martinez and Werner (2002) found evidence that the fixed exchange rate regime in Mexico biased Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
 
 3
analyzing the behavior of foreign currency exposure for a sample of non-financial 
Brazilian companies from 1996 to 2002. This includes a period under a (quasi-) 
fixed exchange rate regime (1996-1998), and a period under a floating regime 
(1999-2002). I analyze whether companies￿ exposure varies with the choice of 
the exchange rate regime. Moreover, I discriminate among the several 
determinants of companies￿ exchange rate exposure, and finally I study the 
relationship among corporate financial policies, the choice of the exchange rate 
regime, and the exchange rate exposure.  
  Brazil provides a perfect natural experiment for analyzing the relationship 
between foreign currency exposure and the choice of exchange rate regime in 
emerging markets. Brazil is one of the largest emerging markets economies, and 
had a (quasi-) fixed exchange rate regime from 1995 to January 1999. After that 
the currency was allowed to float freely, currency derivatives were available in 
both periods and companies kept substantial levels of foreign currency 
denominated debt. Finally, I know of no studies combining analysis of the 
exposure of companies, the determinants of that exposure and the role of the 
exchange rate regime in an emerging market economy in which fluctuations in 
the exchange rate and risk management policies are of major importance to the 
real economy. 
The main results can be summarized as follows.  Fluctuations in the 
exchange rate are indeed problematic for emerging markets like Brazil; about 
40% of Brazilian companies are exposed to changes in the exchange rate, and, 
unlike those in the US, Brazilian companies do not on average benefit from 
devaluations of the home currency. A 1% change in the exchange rate leads to a 
0.22% fall in the average company￿s stock market returns.  
This paper also shows that the floating exchange rate regime has been 
able to reduce such exposure. Under the fixed exchange rate regime about 60% 
of the companies are exposed to fluctuations on the real exchange rate; this 
proportion drops to 23% under the floating exchange rate regime.  
The results confirm that the high proportion of foreign currency 
denominated debt to total debt is the main source of risk for Brazilian companies, 
and that foreign sales and hedging activities are able to mitigate the negative 
exposure that comes from the impact of the fluctuations of the exchange rate on 
companies￿ foreign liabilities. 
  This paper also associates the reduction in the number of companies 
exposed to changes in the exchange rate with an improvement in companies￿ 
risk management activities associated with the change of the exchange rate 
regime. Under the floating regime, not only do more companies hedge their 
exchange rate exposure, but these firms also hedge a larger proportion of their 
foreign currency denominated debt. Following the optimal hedging literature, I 
find that companies￿ hedging activities are linked to the attempt to reduce their 
foreign currency exposure. Companies with higher ratio of foreign debt to total 
debt are more likely to use currency derivatives.  
                                                                                                                                                
corporate behavior towards foreign debt. Arteta (2002) found in a cross-country sample that deposit dollarization is 
greater under floating regimes, while credit dollarization does not appear to differ across regimes; therefore he found 
little support for the view that flexible exchange rate regimes reduce currency mismatches.  Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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Moreover, using a model developed by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and 
extended by Martinez and Werner (2003), I find that the fixed exchange rate 
regime induced companies to incur mismatches in their balance sheets, whereas 
the floating regime has been able to reduce such mismatches by leading 
companies to take seriously their exposure to fluctuations in the exchange rate.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I analyze the Brazilian 
experience, and show the data that will be used throughout the text. In section 3, 
I describe the methodology that will be used to estimate companies￿ exchange 
rate exposure. Then, I estimate the exposure of Brazilian companies to 
fluctuations in the exchange rate, and I show the results for the role of the 
exchange rate regime on companies￿ exposure. In section 4, I estimate the main 
determinants of companies￿ exchange exposure. In section 5, I estimate the main 
determinants of companies￿ hedging activities in both regimes. In section 6, I test 
the role of the exchange rate regime on companies￿ foreign currency borrowing. 




2.1 Macroeconomic Background 
 
The Brazilian economy offers a perfect natural experiment in which to 
analyze the role of the exchange rate regime in determining corporate exchange 
rate exposure. From 1995 to 1998, Brazil adopted a crawling-peg exchange rate 
regime.
9 During this period, Brazil suffered from several speculative attacks, 
especially during the Asian and Russian crises. The Central Bank reacted 
promptly to such attacks by raising interest rates in order to maintain the regime, 
demonstrating clearly its commitment to the exchange rate regime even at the 
cost of maintaining high interest rates, increasing the public debt, and causing an 
economic recession. Figure 1 shows the response of the Central Bank to these 
speculative attacks, and the behavior of some macroeconomic variables during 
the period. Table 1 shows that this first period is characterized by a low volatility 
of the nominal exchange rate and by a high volatility of the nominal interest rate, 
and domestic stock-market returns (Ibovespa). 
   After a speculative attack in January 1999, the currency was allowed to 
float, and an inflation-target system was adopted. After tightening monetary and 
fiscal policies, Brazil succeeded in stabilizing inflation and the exchange rate, and 
the economy recovered quickly from the crisis. Table 1 shows that under the 
floating regime the interest rate and stock-market volatilities were much lower 
than in the previous period, and the exchange rate volatility increased 
considerably, suggesting that ’fear of floating’
10 was not a characteristic of the 
new regime. In 2002, due to the possibility that a new president not aligned with 
the current policies would be elected, a reversal of capital flow took place, and 
the exchange rate depreciated more than 50% during the year with a consequent 
                                                 
9 Strictly speaking a system of bands was adopted with the top and bottom of the band being devalued at a fixed rate. 
10 Calvo and Reinhardt (2001). Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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  I gather data from two main sources: Economatica, and companies￿ 
annual reports. Economatica gives stock market returns and accounting data for 
all publicly traded companies. I also gather data directly from companies￿ annual 
reports, if information is not available, or to confirm the quality of the data. I use 
data from a sample of Brazilian non-financial companies from 1996 to 2002. The 
description of all variables used throughout the text is shown in the appendix. 
The period from 1996 to 2002 was chosen not only because it is possible to 
compare the behavior of companies￿ foreign currency exposure under different 
exchange rate regimes, but also because the use of derivatives was required to 
be reported only after 1995
11. I use data for all the companies that were in the 
database in 1996 and stayed until 2002, a total of 165 companies. This is a 
subset of all available companies, but I use this procedure in order to give a 
better comparison of companies￿ behavior under the two different exchange rate 
regimes.  
Hedge and foreign currency debt variables are available in the annual 
reports under the explanatory notes. The amount of foreign debt is located under 
the item loans and financing. Hedge activity is registered under the item financial 
instruments. There is no systematic information about foreign sales. Sometimes 
it is reported together with gross sales, sometimes under the comments from the 
managers to shareholders, or in the explanatory notes. Some companies 
mentioned being exporters, but did not report the amount of sales; in this case, I 
contacted the companies directly through electronic mail. In the end, I had to 
discard seven companies that mentioned being exporters but neither reported 
the amount of their foreign sales nor answered my mail.  
I use the index from Sao Paulo stock exchange (IBOVESPA) as my 
domestic market return. I use the 30-day SELIC interest rate as my risk-free rate. 
All variables are deflated by the general index of prices (IGP). As observed by 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), and Dominguez and Tesar (2001) the use of a 
trade-weighted exchange rate might lead the researcher to reject the hypothesis 
that companies are exposed since fluctuations on different exchange rates might 
cancel out, resulting in a rejection of the hypothesis that the company is exposed. 
In order to avoid this problem, and since most of Brazilian trade is in American 
dollars and almost all foreign debt is issued in this currency, I develop the 
analysis of companies￿ exposure by using the exchange rate Real/Dollar. 
Therefore, I adopt the convention that companies with positive (negative) 
exposure benefit (suffer) from depreciations of the home currency. This definition 
will be carried throughout the text.   
 
                                                 
11 Securities and Exchange commission of Brazil - CVM instruction Nr. 235/1995 Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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3 Exchange Rate Exposure 
 
  The international finance literature characterizes the impact on companies￿ 
cash flow as the channel through which companies would be exposed to 
fluctuations of the exchange rate
12.  Therefore, the determination of the 
relationship between fluctuations in companies￿ cash flow and changes in the 
exchange rate is the central question for a better understanding of companies￿ 
foreign exposure. Yet, as argued by Bodnar and Wong (2000), the use of cash 
flow variables is not easily applicable for cross-firm comparisons, since it would 
make the analysis extremely complex
13.  
  Adler and Dumas (1984) show that assuming that company￿s value is the 
present value of future cash flows, a company￿s exposure to fluctuations in the 
exchange rate could be determined by the elasticity of the firm value with respect 
changes on the exchange rate. This approach has been extensively used in the 
corporate finance literature, and it is used in this paper in order to determine 
companies￿ vulnerability to fluctuations in the exchange rate, and the relationship 




Adler and Dumas (1984) show that one alternative for estimating 
companies￿ exchange rate exposure would be to regress a firm￿s stock market 
return on changes in the exchange rate.  
                                            jt t osure j j jt s R ε β α + ∆ + = . exp ,                                          (1) 
where Rjt is the weekly (monthly) excess stock market return of firm j, and  t s ∆  is 
the percentage change in the real exchange rate over the same period. Bodnar 
and Wong (2000) show that there are some drawbacks with this specification. 
They show that this exposure captures not only the sensitivity of a firm￿s value to 
changes in the exchange rate, but also the relation between exchange rate 
changes and macroeconomic factors that affect the market value of the firm. 
Using this specification, they find that the exposure of the firm was extremely 
volatile with respect to the period of the estimation, and could not be rationalized 
for any change in the firm￿s or in industry￿s activities. 
The solution found by researchers was to add a market portfolio return in 
(1) in order to control for macroeconomic variables. The new specification is: 
                         jt t osure j t market market j j jt s R R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . . exp , , .                          (2) 
where   t market R ,  is the excess market portfolio return. Bodnar and Wong (2000) 
also show that this specification might suffer with respect to the choice of the 
market portfolio.  
They argue that if the researcher uses a value-weighted portfolio return as 
the market portfolio return, the coefficient of the changes in the exchange rate 
cannot be interpreted as a ￿total￿ exposure, but should be interpreted as the 
                                                 
12 Shapiro (1974), Hodder (1982), Levi (1983), and Flood and Lessard (1986) 
13 See Marston (1998) for more details about the difficulties that arise from the use of cash flow variables. Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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difference between the firm￿s total exposure elasticity and the market exposure 
adjusted by the firm￿s market beta. Therefore, if the market portfolio is exposed to 
the exchange rate, the distribution of the firm￿s exposure will be shifted. They 
also argue that because large firms have more weight in value-weighted 
portfolios, and these firms are more likely to be exposed to fluctuations in the 
exchange rate (since they usually are multinational corporations) the estimates of 
the firm￿s exposure would be biased.  
There are two ways to solve this problem. Bodnar and Wong (2000) show 
that the use of an equally-weighted portfolio improves the results of the 
estimation of (2), since this measure is not biased towards larger companies. A 
second way is advocated by Bris et al (2002). Inspired by Jorion (1991), although 
using the opposite approach, the authors use a two-step approach to mitigate the 
problem. 
In the first step, they regress the market portfolio on the changes in the 
exchange rate, estimating the following regression, 
                                        t t t market s R υ γ γ + ∆ + = . 1 0 ,                                                   (3) 
Then, they get the component of the market portfolio return that is orthogonal to 




, , ∆ + − = γ γ t market t market R F . 
Finally, they estimate the following equation, 
                                 jt t osure j t market market j j jt s F R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . . exp , , ,                             (4) 
where Rjt is the weekly (monthly) stock return of firm j,  t market F ,  is the estimated 
orthogonal component of the market portfolio, and t s ∆  is the percentage change 
in the real exchange rate over the same period.         
    This approach circumvents the critiques made by Bodnar and Wong 
(2000), and it has the advantage that the coefficients of the exposure are 




  Table 2 shows that some interesting results arise from the estimation of 
companies￿ exchange exposure. First, table 2 shows the destabilizing potential of 
fluctuations of the exchange rate. On average, Brazilian companies do not 
benefit from a depreciation of the domestic currency. According model (2), a one-
percent depreciation of the home currency leads to a 0.22 percent fall in stock 
market returns. This result confirms the hypothesis that in relatively closed and 
high indebted emerging countries like Brazil, depreciations of the home currency 
are more likely to cause a fall in asset prices
14.  
Table 2 also reinforces the significance of the fluctuations of the exchange 
rate. In both models, about 35% of the companies are exposed to fluctuations of 
the exchange rate; this result is well above a random choice model, showing that 
                                                 
14 Similar results are found by Dominguez and Tesar (2001) for Thailand. They find that most of  significant exposures 
are negative. Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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these estimates are not the result of a spurious relationship between two high 
volatile variables.  
  Table 2 also confirms the importance of orthogonalizing the market 
returns. Using the market portfolio as the control variable, the number of 
companies with positive and negative significant exposure is almost the same. 
Once we orthogonalize the market returns, the number of companies with 
negative exposure increases considerably. Since in Brazil larger firms dominate 
market portfolio, and these companies, as shown in Rossi (2003), are more likely 
to hold debt denominated in foreign currency, the market portfolio is likely to be 
negatively affected by changes in the exchange rate
15. Because market portfolio 
is negatively exposed to fluctuations of the exchange rate, it is expected that 
when controlling using the market portfolio, a higher number of companies with 
significant positive exposure and a lower number of companies with negative 
exposure show up, since these estimated exposures are relative to the market 
portfolio. Yet, once market portfolio is orthogonalized, there is a reduction in the 
number of companies with positive exposure, and an increase in those with 
negative exposure, since we now have absolute exposures, which are not 
relative to the market portfolio. 
 
3.3 Exchange Rate Exposure and the Exchange Rate Regime 
 
The results in table 2 can be interpreted as companies￿ average exposure 
over the period between 1996 and 2002. As argued by Dumas and Solnik (1995), 
and de Santis and Gerard (1998), the assumption that companies￿ exposure 
does not vary with time is too strong, especially during our period of estimation, 
when Brazil changed its exchange rate regime from a fixed exchange rate regime 
to a floating one. Table 3 sheds light on this subject. I divide the sample into the 
fixed exchange rate period from January 1996 to October 1998, and a flexible 
exchange rate period from April 1999 to December 2002. I discard the data from 
November 1998 to March 1999, since it corresponds to the period of the currency 
crises.   
  Table 3 shows that the floating exchange rate regime indeed helps to 
alleviate the problem of companies￿ exposure to fluctuations in exchange rate. 
Under the floating exchange rate regime, only 23% of the companies are 
exposed to fluctuations in the exchange rate; however, under the fixed exchange 
rate regime more than 60% of the companies are exposed to fluctuations in the 
exchange rate.  
  Table 3 also shows that independent of the exchange rate regime, the 
median of the companies￿ exchange rate exposure has a negative value, 
implying that although the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime is able to 
reduce the number of companies significantly exposed, fluctuations in the 
exchange rate are still problematic for a reasonable number of companies. 
 
                                                 
15 Indeed, the result of the estimation of the first step shows that  t t market R s * ) 37 . 0 ( 45 . 0 ) 010 . 0 ( 004 . 0 , ∆ − − = ; confirming 
the hypothesis that market portfolio is negatively exposed. Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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3.4 Robustness checks 
 
  I perform several checks in order to verify the robustness of the results. 
Most empirical works trying to estimate exchange rate exposure use a trade-
weighted exchange rate. I follow this procedure by using a traded-weighted 
exchange rate calculated by the average exchange rate between Brazil and its 
main trade partners. The results can be found in tables 4 and 5. The results 
confirm Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Dominguez and Tesar (2001) who 
argue that the use of a trade-weighted exchange rate might understate the 
exposure of the companies. Tables 4 and 5 show that there is a reduction in the 
number of companies with significant exchange rate exposure when a trade-
weighted exchange rate is used, but the results with respect to the importance of 
the exchange rate regime are robust with respect to the choice of the exchange 
rate. 
Following Parsley and Popper (2002), I estimate the following equation: 
          jt t j flexible t j fixed t market market j j jt Flexible s Fixed s R R ε β β β α + ∆ + ∆ + + = * . * . . , , , ,         (5) 
where Fixed stands for a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 during the 
fixed exchange rate period, and Flexible stands for a dummy variable that 
assumes the value 1 during the flexible exchange rate period. Again, the results 
(not shown) indicate a reduction in companies￿ exposure when a floating 
exchange rate regime is adopted. 
  
4 The Determinants of Companies￿ Exchange Rate 
Exposure 
 
The result found in the previous section, that the floating exchange rate 
regime was able to reduce the number of companies with a significant exchange 
rate exposure, might be driven for different reasons, since the exchange 
exposure of a company is related to multiple factors. In order to discriminate 
among these different factors, in this section I analyze the different determinants 
of companies￿ exchange rate exposure.     
The literature identifies two types of exchange rate exposure: Economic 
and Translation exposure. Economic exposure represents the impact of changes 
in the exchange rate on companies￿ cash flow; this is the type of exposure we are 
concerned with, since it will affect the market value of the firm.  Economic 
exposure can be divided into transaction and operating exposures. Transaction 
exposure takes place when a company has a contract denominated in foreign 
currency which is to be settled at a future date. Companies that sell products, 
that buy inputs from abroad, and that have foreign currency denominated debt 
are all subject to transaction exposure. The ratio of foreign sales to total sales is 
expected to be positively correlated with companies￿ exchange exposure since 
exporters benefit from depreciations of the home currency. The opposite is true 
for importers and foreign currency debtors.  
Operating exposure reflects the effects of changes in the exchange rate 
on companies￿ financial or operational contracts. This type of exposure is directly Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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related to the degree of competition that the company has. Depreciations of the 
domestic currency reduce the competitiveness of the foreign companies, since it 
raises the price of imported goods in domestic currency, leading to an 
improvement in domestic companies￿ cash flow
16; therefore, domestic companies 
that compete more fiercely with foreign ones are expected to be more exposed to 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
Translation exposure refers to the effect of changes in the exchange rate 
on companies￿ financial accounting statements; companies that have foreign 
subsidiaries are subject to translation exposure, since the value of their foreign 
assets varies with changes in the exchange rate. It is important to realize that this 
type of exposure does not affect companies￿ cash flow, only their financial 
statements. 
Companies would reduce their exposure to fluctuations of the exchange 
rate by making use of hedging instruments. The literature identifies two types of 
hedge: Operational hedges, and financial hedges.  
Operational hedges pertain to companies with foreign subsidiaries, since 
these companies will be protected from fluctuations of the home currency by 
having a fraction of their revenue coming from abroad. The literature identifies 
operational hedges as being more effective for long-term fluctuations of the 
exchange rate.  
Financial hedges stand for the use of currency derivatives ￿ swaps, 
futures, forwards, and options ￿ to mitigate companies￿ foreign exposure. This 
type of hedging is usually associated with short-term fluctuations of the exchange 
rate. 
None of the many previous studies analyzes the determinants of foreign 
exposure for emerging markets; they primarily focus on developed countries. 
Jorion (1990) finds for a sample of American companies a positive relationship 
between the ratio of foreign sales and foreign exposure. Bodnar and Gentry 
(1993) find for a sample of U.S., Canadian and Japanese companies that non-
traded industries and industries with higher import ratios gain from appreciations 
of the domestic currency, the opposite with respect to industries with higher 
export ratios. Moreover, they find that except for the U.S., industries with a higher 
level of the use of internationally-priced inputs benefit from appreciations, and 
companies with foreign assets have positive exposures. He and Ng (1998), for a 
sample of Japanese multinational companies, are able to link foreign exchange 
exposure with export ratio and variables that might explain the use of currency 
derivatives. Guay (1999) found that firm risk declines following derivatives use. 
Carter et. al. (2001) finds evidence that operational hedges (foreign operations) 
and financial hedges (use of derivatives) effectively reduce foreign currency 
exposure. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find a positive relation between exchange 
rate exposure and the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and a negative 
relationship between the use of currency derivatives and foreign exposure, 
showing that foreign currency derivatives are effective in reducing companies￿ 
                                                 
16 Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) and Campa and Goldberg (1995) study the relationship between investment, pass-through, 
industry competition, and changes in the exchange rate. Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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foreign exposure. Similar results are found by Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) for a 
sample of Swedish companies.  
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the main determinants of 
companies￿ foreign exposure, and their behavior during the sample period.  The 
size of the company has an ambiguous effect on its exposure. On the one hand, 
larger companies might be able to borrow more from abroad; therefore, one 
should expect a negative relationship between exposure and size. On the other 
hand, if there are fixed costs of hedging, one should expect that larger 
companies would make a more extensive use of currency derivatives, implying a 
reduction in their exchange rate exposure. The logarithms of total assets and 
total sales expressed in US dollars are used as proxies for the size of the 
companies. Both variables had a similar behavior during the period. They 
dropped in the aftermath of the crisis, as a result of the devaluation of the 
currency. The t-test does not reject the hypothesis that the mean of the size 
variables is equal across both exchange rate regimes. 
Table 6 reports that the number of exporters is stable under the two 
exchange rate regimes; around 60% of the companies in the sample sell their 
products abroad. Table 6 also shows that the traditional expenditure-switching 
effect took place after the devaluation. The ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
increases from 14.4% right before the crisis to 17.9% in 2002. Still, the t-test 
does not reject the hypothesis that the average ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
is equal across regimes.  
Table 6 shows that the ratio of foreign debt to total debt is stable across 
the two exchange rate regimes. About 80% of the companies in the sample hold 
foreign denominated debt, and, on average, the companies keep about 50% of 
their total debt in foreign currency.  
Table 6 reports that under the flexible exchange rate regime companies 
use currency derivatives more intensively. The only variables for which the t-test 
rejects the equality of the means under both regimes are the variables related to 
hedging activities. Under the flexible regime not only do more companies use 
foreign currency derivatives, but they also raise the ratio of the amount of 
derivatives to total assets. In 1998, right before the crisis, just 15% of the 
companies used foreign currency derivatives; in 2002, under the flexible 
exchange rate regime, more than 40% of the companies in the sample used 
foreign currency derivatives. The ratio of the amount of derivatives to total assets 
increased from 1.17% in 1999 to 4.73% in 2002. 
Table 6 also shows that the flexible exchange rate regime was able to 
reduce the ratio of short-term debt to total debt, moving it from an average of 
52% under the fixed exchange rate regime to 50% under the floating one. But the 
t-test does not reject the equality of the means under both regimes. 
In order to perform a more formal analysis of the main determinants of 
companies￿ foreign exposure, I estimate the following equation: 
       
          )   /   .( 3 )   / .( 2 )   /    .( 1 i Debt Total Debt Foreign a Assets Total s Derivative a Sales Total Sales Foreign a const i ε β + + + + =           (6) 
 Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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 where  i β are the foreign currency exposures estimated in table 2. The 
independent variables are the average of the variables during the sample period.  
The results are shown in Table 7. 
The results in Table 7 indicate that there is a positive relationship between 
size and exchange rate exposure, but this result is not robust across different 
specifications. Therefore, there is (weak) evidence that size is an important 
determinant of companies￿ exchange exposure.  
 As expected, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales is positively related to 
companies￿ exchange exposure. According to the model (2), a one percent 
change in the ratio of foreign sales to total sales has a positive effect on the 
exposure of the companies by 0.82 percent. Agreeing with our predictions, the 
ratio of foreign debt to total debt negatively affects companies￿ exchange 
exposure. A one percent increase in the ratio of foreign denominated debt to total 
debt negatively impacts companies￿ foreign exposure by 0.54 percent. These 
results are robust across different specifications, and the presence of control 
variables. 
Results in Table 7 show that the use of currency derivatives does alleviate 
companies￿ exposure to fluctuations in the exchange rate. If the ratio of the 
amount of derivatives to total assets increases by one percent, companies￿ 
exposure changes by 0.34. This positive effective of the use of currency 
derivatives on companies￿ foreign exposure is also robust with respect to the 
model used in the estimation, and with respect to the inclusion of control 
variables.  
Among the control variables, the ratio of short-term debt to total debt is a 
significant determinant of companies￿ foreign exposure. Companies with higher 
levels of short-term debt are more likely to suffer from depreciations of the home 
currency, since there will be an increase in their interest expenses not only for 
their short-term foreign debt, but also for their domestic debt, since the Central 
Bank will react to devaluations of the exchange rate by raising domestic interest 
rates. Therefore, companies with a higher level of short-term debt are more likely 
to suffer from financial distress following depreciations of the domestic currency. 
The results do not confirm the hypothesis that operational hedges have 
positive effects on companies￿ exposure. A dummy that assumes the value 1 if 
the firm has foreign subsidiaries is not statistically significant in all specifications, 
and it has the opposite sign from what was expected. Therefore, it seems that 
markets do not care whether companies have operations abroad.  
The results show that the issue of ADRs has positive effects on 
companies￿ exchange exposure. This might be an indication that these 
companies are more likely to be able to manage their foreign exposure more 
effectively, yet ownership does not seem to matter with respect to the 
determination of exchange rate exposure; it seems that domestic and foreign 
companies have similar exposures. 
The results so far have shown that companies￿ hedging activities, foreign 
currency borrowing, and foreign sales are the main determinants of companies￿ 
exchange rate exposure. In the next sections, I analyze how these variables 
interact with each other, and the mechanism through which the floating exchange Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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rate regime affects such variables resulting in a reduction in the number of the 
companies significantly exposed to fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
 
5 Hedging and the exchange rate Regime 
 
This section studies in more detail companies￿ hedging activities and their 
relation to the exchange rate regime. Table 8 shows the behavior of hedging 
activities during the period from 1996 to 2002.  
Table 8 shows that companies￿ hedging activities vary considerably across 
exchange rate regimes. Under the fixed exchange rate regime, the number of 
hedgers is much lower than under the floating exchange rate regime. This result 
is consistent for any type of hedging alternative. Both, the number of companies 
that use currency derivatives, and those that use foreign assets increased 
steadily during the period. Table 8 also shows that companies prefer to use 
currency derivatives rather than foreign assets to hedge their exposure. During 
the whole period, more than half of the hedgers preferred currency derivatives to 
foreign assets. Table 8 also reports that under the floating regime, not only do 
more firms use currency derivatives, but also they raise the extent of their use. 
Right before the crisis in 1998, the average ratio of the amount of currency 
derivatives to total foreign debt was 6.56%; this ratio increased steadily during 
the floating regime, reaching 25% in 2002. 
Table 9 reports the results for the choice among currency derivatives. It 
shows that currency swaps are the most preferred among all possible 
derivatives. This can be viewed as evidence that the hedging activities of 
Brazilian companies are linked to their attempt to reduce their foreign currency 
exposure, and are not for speculative purposes, since swaps are usually 
preferred when the sources of exposure extend for multiple periods but are 
predetermined. This is the case when liabilities are denominated in foreign 
currency. By contrast, forward contracts are preferred when the main source of 
exposure is related to short-term transactions that are characterized by 
uncertainty. This is the case of foreign revenues derived from exports. These 
practices are completely different from those found in previous studies of 
developed countries. Geczy et al (1997) show for a sample of U.S. companies 
that forward contracts, or a combination between forwards and options contracts, 
were the most preferred instruments. Judge (2002) finds similar results for a 
sample of British companies. He finds that forwards were the most frequently 
used instruments, followed by swaps and options. The preference for swaps is 
stable across periods and is therefore independent of the exchange rate regime. 
There is evidence that the main concern of Brazilian hedgers was the possibility 
that fluctuations of the exchange rate could affect their liabilities. This fact will be 
tested in the next section.  
 Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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5.1 The Determinants of the use of Currency Derivatives 
 
5.1.1 Related Literature 
 
In order to identify the main determinants of the use of currency 
derivatives, the theoretical literature needs to depart from the assumptions of the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958), since under their assumptions, a firm would be 
indifferent about whether to hedge or not, since its value would be independent 
of its capital structure.  
Smith and Stulz (1985) assert that given the existence of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs it would be optimal for firms to hedge. They show that by 
reducing the variability of firms’ cash flow, hedging would reduce their tax liability, 
and the probability of incurring in bankruptcy costs, therefore raising their post-
tax value. They also analyze the possibility that risk-averse managers would 
prefer to hedge, because reducing the variability of a firm￿s cash flow would 
increase its expected utility, since it is dependent on the firm￿s payoffs.   
Froot et al (1992) show that if capital markets are imperfect, hedging 
would increase firms’ value by insuring they have sufficient internal funds. A 
variable cash flow would lead to more variability either in the amount raised 
externally, or in the investment. Therefore, firms with higher growth opportunities 
would want to hedge in order to mitigate their underinvestment problem. 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) show that hedging would allow the market to draw 
better inferences on manager ability.   
Firms might use currency derivatives to reduce their exposure to 
fluctuations of the exchange rate. Firms whose cash flow is more sensitive to 
exchange rate fluctuations would derive great benefits from hedging; this would 
be the case for exporters, firms with foreign subsidiaries or firms that hold foreign 
currency denominated debt.    
Foreign denominated debt per se might be used as a way to hedge 
exchange rate fluctuations. Firms with revenue in foreign currency might issue 
debt denominated in foreign currency in order to avoid mismatches in their 
balance sheets. This alternative seems implausible in emerging markets, where 
foreign currency debt is the main concern with respect to exchange rate 
exposure as shown in the previous section.     
There is a vast empirical literature that attempts to discriminate among the 
different theories about the use of currency derivatives (Wysocki (1995), Mian 
(1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Graham and Rogers (2000), Allayannis and Ofek 
(2001), He and Ng (1998), and Carter et al. (2001), among others).
17 Although 
extensive, none of the previous papers analyzes the hedging practices in 
emerging markets, where exchange rate crises create a natural experiment in 
risk management practices. One exception is Allayannis et al. (2003). The 
authors study the use of foreign derivatives for a sample of East-Asian 
companies right before the financial crisis in 1997. Moreover,  unlike this paper, 
                                                 
17 For the relationship between the use of derivatives and investment see Allayannis and Mozumbar (1999). For the 
relationship between the use of currency derivatives and firm value see Allayannis and Weston (2001) Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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none of the previous works studies the relationship between the use of 
derivatives and the exchange rate regime.  
  
5.1.2 Univariate Analysis     
 
Table 10 reports summary statistics for the comparison between users 
and non-users of currency derivatives. Although Table 10 does not show any 
causal relationship, it helps to clarify the differences between foreign currency 
derivative users and non-users. Table 10 shows that the number of hedgers 
varies considerably between the two exchange rate regimes. Before 1999, just a 
fraction less than 8% of the companies use currency derivatives. This ratio jumps 
to 40% in 2002. These results suggest that the higher the volatility of the 
exchange rate, the higher the number of firms that use derivatives in order to 
hedge their exchange rate exposure.  
Table 10 also shows that given that a firm is a hedger, when the economy 
moves from a fixed exchange rate regime to a floating one, the extent of hedging 
activities increases. Table 10 shows that the amount of foreign debt hedged 
increased from 39.6% in 1996 to 62.0% in 2002; therefore, not only did more 
firms use currency derivatives, but currency derivatives were used to a greater 
extent.  
Companies can use foreign assets as substitutes for or complements to 
the use of derivatives. Table 10 suggests that Brazilian companies see foreign 
assets as a complement to the use of derivatives; derivatives users have higher 
ratios of foreign assets to total assets than non-users. 
The corporate finance literature states that the relationship between the 
use of derivatives and size of the company is ambiguous. If fixed costs of 
hedging are important, one would expect large companies to hedge more than 
small firms. In opposition, if small firms are more constrained, therefore more 
dependent on their internal funds, they would hedge more in order to avoid 
fluctuations in their cash flow. Table 10 shows that under the floating exchange 
rate regime users of currency derivatives are larger than non-users, although the 
t-test does not reject the hypothesis that both means are equal. This relationship 
between size and the use of currency derivatives is weaker under the fixed 
exchange rate regime. This might be an indicator that larger firms that were 
exposed during the fixed regime try, with the adoption of the floating regime, to 
reduce their exposure by increasing their hedging activities.    
Table 10 also supports the idea that companies use currency derivatives 
to reduce their foreign exposure. Companies with higher ratios of foreign sales to 
total sales, firms that have foreign operations, and those with higher levels of 
foreign debt to total debt are more likely to use currency derivatives.  
The results with respect to the hypothesis that firms hedge in order to 
reduce their probability of financial distress are mixed. Users have lower levels of 
interest coverage than non-users, indicating that financial distress might be 
important to the decision whether to hedge. But there is no evidence that 
currency derivative users have higher levels of short-term debt to total debt than Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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non-users. The t-test indicates that there is no systematic difference between 
users and non-users with respect to this variable.   
If firms want to hedge in order to mitigate the underinvestment problem, 
theory says that firms with higher growth opportunities would hedge more. Table 
10 shows that this pattern does not appear in the data. There is no systematic 
relationship between investment opportunities measured by the ratio of capital 
expenses to total sales or by the market-to-book ratio and the use of derivatives. 
Only for 2000 does the t-test not reject the hypothesis that the mean of the 
market-to-book ratio is higher for users of currency derivatives. 
  Finally, there is evidence that companies hedge as a way to signal to 
investors. Derivative users issue more ADRs than non-users. Hedging would 
signal to investors that a firm is trying to minimize fluctuations of its cash flow and 
thus maximize the value of the company. Table 7 corroborates with this 
hypothesis, indicating a positive relationship between the use of currency 
derivatives and the issuance of ADRs. 
 
5.1.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
The estimation results for the determinants of the use of foreign currency 
derivatives are in Table 11. I use two different dependent variables: the 
percentage of foreign debt hedged by the use of currency derivatives, and the 
ratio of the amount of currency derivatives to total assets. Given the 
characteristics of these variables, I perform TOBIT estimation. I analyze these 
determinants before and after the currency crisis in order to verify if the change in 
the exchange rate regime had any effect on the determination of companies￿ 
hedging activities. 
Table 11 shows that the ratio of foreign debt to total debt is the main 
determinant of the extent of companies￿ hedging activities. This variable is 
statistically significant in all specifications. Adding the fact that the swap is the 
most used currency derivative I can conclude that Brazilian companies use 
currency derivatives in order to reduce the exposure of their balance sheets to 
fluctuations in the exchange rate.  
Table 11 also shows that size is a significant variable in the decision of 
hedging, only under the floating exchange rate regime. Under this regime, larger 
firms are more likely to use currency derivatives. One possibility for this result is 
that under the floating exchange rate regime larger companies, especially in the 
non-tradable sector, use currency derivatives to reduce their exposure. In 
opposition, the fixed exchange rate does not give any incentive to these 
companies to hedge their exposure. 
Table 11 reports that neither the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and 
nor the foreign operations dummy is statistically significant.  These results differ 
from those of previous works, but there is some anecdotal evidence for them
18. 
                                                 
18 I give anecdotal evidence by quoting a Brazilian journalist. ￿￿Brazilian exporters should have avoided the 
complaints about the appreciation of the Real if they have considered that a floating exchange rate regime does not 
mean a movement towards a higher devaluation of the currency. As proved in recent times, the real can appreciate with 
respect to the dollar...Exporters could have avoided the losses caused by the volatility of the exchange rate by hedging Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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Defying expectations - under the floating regime- there is a negative (not 
significant) relationship between the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and 
hedging activities. Brazilian exporters might see their foreign sales as a ￿natural￿ 
hedge to the exposure that comes from their foreign currency liabilities. 
Moreover, exporters give low probability to the possibility of an appreciation of 
the domestic currency; therefore they do not expect a loss of revenues due to 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. Given the costs of hedging, they prefer not to 
hedge.    There is no evidence that Brazilian companies use currency 
derivatives to alleviate the underinvestment problem. The ratio of total investment 
to total sales, and the market-to-book ratio are not statistically significant in any 
of the specifications. 
The results are mixed with respect to the possibility of financial distress. 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime, none of our proxies for financial distress 
are statistically significant. Indeed, there is  (weak) evidence that under the 
floating exchange rate regime companies with higher levels of short-term debt 
and with lower levels of interest coverage are more likely to use currency 
derivatives. Again, this difference between the two periods can be attributed to 
the fact that under the floating regime companies are more aware of the dangers 
of fluctuation in the exchange rate, and use currency derivatives to reduce the 
possibility of financial distress.  
Finally, I find that companies that issue ADR are more likely to hedge. 
These firms would try to send a signal to foreign investors that they are trying to 
maximize the value of the company by avoiding disruptions on their cash flow. 
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the dummy for ADR, and the 
extent of the use of derivatives. 
 
5.1.4 Robustness checks 
 
  I perform several checks to verify the robustness of the results. Nance et 
al (1993) suggest the possibility of several substitutes for hedging. They argue 
that issuing convertible debt, or preferred capital can reduce the incentives to 
hedge by controlling the agency problem and the expected financial distress 
costs. They also argue that by keeping more liquid assets a company can reduce 
the probability of financial distress, implying a negative relationship between 
liquidity and hedging. The same applies to more profitable companies since 
these companies are more able to have enough cash flow to offset negative 
shocks, they should hedge less. In a robustness check, I added the current ratio 
and the gross margin as measure of liquidity and profitability, respectively. 
Results show that none of them is significant. I obtain the same results if I 
remove the sectoral dummies from the estimation. All results are robust with 
respect to this matter. 
  Endogeneity might be a problem of our specification. This problem might 
be more severe in the case of the determination of the use of currency 
derivatives. As mentioned by Geczy (1997), choices of capital structure can be 
                                                                                                                                                
their exposures, but they didn’t do it, because they expected the Real to depreciate even more, and by hedging they 
would limit the value of their revenues￿. Sonia Racy, O Estado de Sªo Paulo, 08/12/2003. Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
 
 18
made simultaneously with the decision to use derivatives, leading to a 
simultaneity problem, and biasing our results. It is difficult to solve this problem; I 
use different specifications in order to mitigate it. First, I use the dependent 
variables for 1998 (2002) and the independent variables for 1997 (2001), and the 
results (not shown) corroborate our previous results. Since, in the case of serial 
correlated variables, this procedure is not completely satisfactory, I use a two-
stage procedure
19 to estimate the simultaneous choice of capital structure and 
the use of currency derivatives. Table 12 shows that my findings are robust with 
respect to endogeneity. Brazilian companies use derivatives mainly to reduce the 
foreign exposure coming from their foreign currency denominated liabilities. The 
ratio of foreign debt to total debt is significant in all specifications.   
In addition, I also estimate a two-stage model to split the choice of the use 
of currency derivatives, and the choice of the extent of hedging. In the first stage, 
I estimate a LOGIT specification where the dependent variable assumes the 
value of 1 if the company uses currency derivatives and 0 otherwise. In the 
second stage, I estimate an OLS specification using the extent of the use of 
derivatives as my dependent variable. Results shown (for the first stage) in Table 
13 confirm the robustness of my results. 
 
6 The determinants of Foreign Currency Debt and the 
Exchange Rate Regime 
 
My previous results show that foreign currency denominated debt is the 
main source of risk among Brazilian companies. In this section, I test whether the 
choice of the exchange rate regime has an impact on companies￿ foreign 
currency borrowing. In particular, I answer whether the fixed exchange rate 
regime induced currency mismatches on companies￿ balance sheets. Moreover, I 
also test whether the floating exchange rate regime has been able to mitigate this 
problem by inducing firms to match the currency composition of their balance 
sheets. In order to formalize the empirical analysis, I use the model developed by 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and extended by Martinez and Werner (2002) to 
analyze the role of the exchange rate regime on the choice of the currency of the 
debt. 
 
6.1 Theoretical literature 
  
The international finance literature indicates that the possible existence of 
implicit government guarantees related to the choice of the exchange rate regime 
might bias corporate borrowing towards foreign currency denominated debt.  
Dooley (1997), in the spirit of the first generation models of currency 
crises, identifies financial crises as being caused by a policy conflict between the 
government’s desire to insure financial liabilities of citizens and its desire to hold 
reserve assets as a form of self-insurance. According to the author, a fixed 
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exchange rate regime would be an easy way to insure investors against losses, 
serving as an implicit guarantee.  
Burnside et al (1999) build a model in which implicit guarantees induce 
firms and financial intermediaries to borrow from abroad but do not completely 
hedge against exchange rate risk. According to the authors, a bank has no 
incentive to hedge since the expected value of this strategy is nil. In case of no 
devaluation, buying forward to hedge would generate losses to the bank, and, in 
case of devaluation, the government would seize profits derived from these 
hedging activities. Moreover, they show that absent government guarantees, it 
would be optimal for firms to hedge their exchange rate risk completely. They 
show that as a result of these guarantees, banks lower their interest rates, 
causing a boom in the economy, but this boom leads to a more fragile banking 
system and, consequently, to a financial crisis. Government guarantees are also 
present in Corsetti et al (1999). In their model, these guarantees lead to 
overborrowing, translated as an unsustainable path for the current account 
deficit. Since government bailouts are costly, speculators foresee the use of 
seignoriage by the government, causing the collapse of the currency.   
Schneider and Tornell (2003) emphasize the role of government 
guarantees and asymmetries in sectoral behavior
20.  They highlight the 
dichotomy between tradables and non-tradables. In their model, given the 
presence of bailout guarantees and the inability of the non-tradable sector to 
make a clear commitment to the repayment of its debt, currency mismatches 
arise endogenously, since foreign creditors would extend credit to the non-
tradable sector. This currency mismatch would lead to a self-fulfilling crisis. 
Again, if there were no guarantees, managers would have no incentive to create 
currency mismatches. In the presence of bankruptcy costs, they would prefer to 
hedge the exchange rate risk. The authors show that under the fixed regime, 
firms in the non-tradable sector can grow faster by relaxing their borrowing 
constraints, but in the event of a depreciation, these companies will suffer heavily 
from balance sheet problems
21; therefore, the existence of government 
guarantees related to the choice of a fixed exchange rate regime imposes 
temporal restrictions on companies￿ capital structure. The existence of 
government guarantees implies that under the fixed exchange rate regime, 
companies will not fully internalize the risk of exchange rate fluctuations, 
incurring currency mismatches on their balance sheets; on the contrary, the 
floating exchange rate regime would induce companies to take seriously the 
exchange rate fluctuations, leading them to improve their risk management 
activities by matching the currency composition of their assets, and liabilities.  
 
                                                 
20 Bris and Koskinen (2002) also emphasize differences in sectoral behavior in explaining currency crises. 
They view the crisis as an attempt by government to rescue exporters, given their high leverage and low 
profitability under the fixed exchange rate regime. Their argument rests on the fact that it is optimal for the 
government to save exports by allowing the currency to float since it wants to boost investment in the 
economy. The depreciation would increase the profitability of the exporter sector by increasing their 
revenues in foreign currency and lowering their costs in domestic currency. 
21 The authors claim that this fact would explain the observed boom in the non-tradable sector before the 
recent currency crises. Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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6.2 The Model   
 
The model has two periods. In the first period contracts are signed, and 
investment decisions are made. In the second period, investment returns are 
realized, and claims are settled. There are three risk-neutral parties: 
entrepreneurs, domestic banks that work as financial intermediaries, and foreign 
investors.  
The entrepreneur owns the amount of capital A, and wants to invest the 
amount I. If I exceeds A, the entrepreneur must borrow the difference I-A. 
Entrepreneurs can privately choose between three versions of the project: a 
good version in which private benefit is 0 and the probability of success is PH, a 
bad project with low private benefit b, and a bad project that gives high private 
benefit B, with B>b>0. For both bad projects, the probability of success is given 
by PL. The Moral Hazard problem comes from the fact that without monitoring, 
firms will not have enough benefits in order to behave well. They will deliberately 
reduce the probability of success and get the private benefit B. 
  Domestic banks act as financial intermediaries by monitoring 
entrepreneurs, reducing the firm’s opportunity cost from B to b. All firms cannot 
be monitored because domestic banks must invest some of their own capital in 
the project in order to be credible monitors. Domestic banks demand a rate of 
return r on their investment. Monitoring is privately costly, as domestic banks pay 
the amount c>0 in order to eliminate the possibility of firms obtaining private 
benefit B. Finally, foreign investors are uninformed and demand a rate of return 
r*.  
Following Martinez and Werner (2002), the optimal contract will establish 
that the entrepreneur invests all its capital A, everybody is paid 0 in case the 
project fails, and when the project is successful, the firm gets paid Rf>0, the 
domestic bank is paid Rb >0 and the foreign creditors get Et+1.Ru>0, where Ru is 
the return in dollars and Et+1  is the exchange rate in the second period. The 
investment has a rate of return for unit invested given by R=SdEt+1+Sp-Wp, where 
Sd is the firm’s sales in foreign currency, Sp are the domestic sales, and Wp is the 
cost in domestic currency. The investment return R is divided among all parties; 
therefore, 
                                              Rf+Rb+Et+1.Ru≤R                                         (7) 
  
Total investment has to be financed by all parties, therefore, 
  
                                                A+Ib+Et.Iu=I                                                (8) 
    
where A is the entrepreneur’s capital, Ib is the domestic bank investment, and Iu is 
the foreign investment.   
The incentive compatibility constraint for the firm to undertake a successful 
project and for the bank to monitor are given by 
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Since domestic banks demands rate of return r and foreign investor r*, the 
participation constraints are given by 
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Given r, r*, and A, entrepreneurs choose the level of investment I, Rb, Ru, 
Ib ,and Iu in order to maximize their profits subject to (7) to (12). In equilibrium, all 
constraints will bind, given the firms￿ profit function. After some algebra
22, I get 
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Equation (13) shows that the ratio of foreign debt to total debt is positively 
related to the probability of success Ph, and negatively related to the interest 
rates r and r*, monitoring costs c, and the private benefit b. Rearranging (13), I 
get 
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If there are implicit guarantees, creditors give the same weight to foreign 
and domestic revenue, disregarding the exchange rate risk. However, if creditors 
are aware of the exchange rate risk, the weight of domestic revenue will be 
decreasing with the expected devaluation. This happens because depreciation 
will reduce the value of the domestic sales in foreign currency, decreasing their 
pleadgeable income in foreign currency, and consequently the amount invested 
in the project. This effect will be higher for firms with lower foreign sales, since 
these are less affected by devaluation.  
 
6.3 Empirical Specification 
 
  Given (14), I estimate the following equation, 
                                                 
22 It is beyond the scope of this text to go into the details of the derivation of equation (8). For more details, see 
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i fdebt is the ratio of total foreign debt to total debt for company i at 
the end of time t, 
1 − t
i fdebt  is the ratio of total foreign debt to total debt at the 
beginning of time t, 
t
i size  is the logarithm of total assets of firm i at the end of 
period t, 
t
i fsales  is the ratio of foreign sales to total debt, 
t
i dsales  is the ratio of 
domestic sales to total debt. I use as control variables a dummy that assumes 
the value 1 if a company issued ADRs, and 0 otherwise, in order to control for 
monitoring costs and the benefits of shirking. In addition, I include the ratio of 
investment to sales to control for companies￿ growth opportunities, and industry 
dummies. I follow the same strategy in the previous section, and I split the 
sample according the exchange rate regime. Given the limits of the dependent 
variable I perform a TOBIT estimation.  
I test whether during the fixed exchange rate regime and the floating 
exchange rate regime the coefficients of the ratio of foreign sales to total debt 
and the ratio of domestic sales to total debt are equal. In the case in which the 
test does not reject the null that both coefficients are equal, I conclude that 
creditors totally disregard the exchange rate risk, and that implicit guarantees 
were an important characteristic of the period. On the other hand, if the test 
rejects the null, I conclude that there were no implicit guarantees and that agents 




   Table 14 shows the results for the estimation of equation (15).  The results 
confirm the hypothesis that the fixed exchange rate regime led creditors and 
debtors to disregard their exchange rate risk. Under the fixed exchange rate 
regime, both coefficients for domestic sales and foreign sales are not statistically 
significant at 10% level of confidence, and I cannot reject the hypothesis that 
both coefficients are equal. Therefore, under the fixed regime, the size of the 
company was the main determinant of its foreign exposure, and companies are 
induced to incur currency mismatches in their balance sheets. 
In opposition to this, under the floating exchange rate regime, both the 
ratio of foreign sales to total debt and the ratio of domestic sales to total debt are 
now statistically significant at 10%. Moreover, the F-test rejects at 10% level of 
significance the null hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients. Thus, under the 
floating exchange rate, exports are more exposed to fluctuations on the 
exchange rate since their dollar income is less sensitive to these fluctuations.  
Table 14 shows that neither the coefficient for ADR nor the ratio of total 
investment to sales is statistically significant. As discussed in Allayannis et al 
(2003), the negative relation between the ADR variable and the ratio of foreign 
debt to total debt might come from the fact that the firms that issued ADRs move 
up in the pecking order
23, preferring to finance their new investment by issuing 
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equity. The agency cost theory might explain the negative relation between 
growth opportunities and leverage. Companies with higher growth opportunities 
would have less incentive to choose risky projects, and would therefore prefer to 




This paper analyzes the relationship between the choice of the exchange 
rate regime and companies￿ exchange rate exposure for a sample of non-
financial Brazilian companies. Some interesting patterns arise from the analysis. 
First, the paper shows that the number of companies vulnerable to fluctuations 
on the exchange rate in an emerging country like Brazil is much higher than the 
number in developed countries. In the period between 1996 and 2002, around 
40% of companies were exposed to fluctuations on the exchange rate Real 
against Dollar. Second, I show that this exposure varies according to the 
exchange rate regime. The number of companies exposed during the floating 
exchange rate regime is much lower than under the fixed one. I estimate that the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales, the ratio of foreign debt to total debt, and the 
extent of companies￿ hedging activities are the main determinants of companies￿ 
exchange rate exposure. I then give evidence that the reduction in companies￿ 
exposure comes from the fact that under the floating exchange rate regime, not 
only do companies use more currency derivatives more extensively to reduce 
their foreign exchange rate exposure, but  they also try to reduce the currency 
mismatches on their balance sheets.  
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) define the ’’original sin’’ as the 
difficulty for domestic firms in emerging markets to borrow in local currency. 
According to them, it is not the case that these companies do not want to hedge 
their exposure, but that they are not allowed to do it, since hedging would mean 
these companies could borrow in local currency. As a result, both fixed and 
floating regimes would be problematic for these countries. I show that, at least 
with respect to Brazil, this is not completely true. I provide some evidence that 
the floating regime can mitigate the problem of the ￿original sin’. I show that not 
only does the floating regime induce more firms to hedge, but also that these 
companies hedge more their currency exposure, leading them to reduce the 
currency mismatch on their balance sheets. Therefore, there is a clear 
relationship between the choice of the exchange rate, and countries￿ 
vulnerability. Under the floating exchange rate regime, countries are less 
vulnerable. Being less vulnerable does not mean that the floating exchange rate 
regime completely insulates countries from external shocks. Fluctuations in the 
exchange rate are still problematic for the country, but the floating exchange rate 
regime leads companies to be more aware of the risk of keeping unhedged 
positions, thus reducing the possibility of huge economic downturns. Brazil is a 
clear example of such a situation. In 2002, under the floating regime, the Real 
depreciated more than 50% and months later the Brazilian economy was back on 
track, showing that the floating regime induced companies to be prepared for 
sudden swings in the behavior of the exchange rate. Therefore, even if the Foreign Exchange Exposure, Corporate Financial Policies, and the Exchange Rate Regime: Evidence from Brazil  
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choice of the exchange rate might not be the primary solution for the reduction of 
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Interest rate and Exchange Rate Volatility 
Table 1 reports the standard deviation of monthly percent changes in the SELIC interest rate, the 
nominal exchange rate Real versus Dollar, and domestic stock market returns (Ibovespa) in 
Reais.  
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, and Economatica. 
Year  Interest Rate  Exchange Rate  Ibovespa(in 
Reais) 
1996 3.11%  0.08%  6.04% 
1997 24.07%  0.11%  12.16% 
1998 24.26%  0.17%  16.99% 
1999 17.70%  19.73%  10.29% 
2000 8.23%  2.00%  8.89% 
2001 13.95%  5.04%  9.90% 







Figure 1 shows Brazilian macroeconomic performance from 1996 to 2002. Interest rate is SELIC 
basic rate, Exchange rate is Real versus US$ dollar, and inflation is calculated using IGP-DI. 




































Exchange Rate Exposure for Brazilian Companies 1996-2002 
Table 2 reports the mean, median, maximum, and minimum of companies￿ exchange rate exposure. Model 
1 stands for the estimation of the equation:  jt t s j t market R j market j jt R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . , . , . Where Rjt is the monthly 
excess stock return of firm j,  t market R ,   is the market portfolio excess return (Ibovespa) and  t s ∆  is the 
percentage change in the real exchange rate over the same period. Model 2 stands for the estimation of 
jt t s j t market F j market j jt R ε δ β α + ∆ + + = . , . ,   Where Rjt is the monthly stock return of firm j,  t market F ,  is the 
estimated orthogonal component of the market portfolio, and t s ∆  is the percentage change in the real 
exchange rate over the same period.   Table 2 reports the number of firms with positive and negative 
significant exposure at 10% level of significance. Newey-West consistent covariance matrix is estimated.     
Model (1)  (2) 
Mean -0.032  -0.22 
Median -0.10  -0.24 
Maximum 2.97  2.33 
Minimum -1.48  -1.68 
Negative   27  55 
Positive   24  9 






Exchange Rate Exposure for Brazilian Companies and the Exchange rate regime 
Table 3 reports the mean, median, maximum, and minimum of companies￿ foreign exposure for two different 
periods. Fixed stands for the fixed exchange rate period from Jan.1996 to Oct. 1998. Flexible stands for the 
floating exchange rate regime from April.1999 to December 2002. Model 1 stands for the estimation of the 
equation:  jt t s j t market R j market j jt R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . , . , . Where Rjt is the monthly excess stock return of firm j, 
t market R ,  is the market portfolio excess return (Ibovespa) and  t s ∆  is the percentage change in the real 
exchange rate over the same period. Model 2 stands for the estimation of 
jt t s j t market F j market j jt R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . , . ,   Where Rjt is the monthly stock return of firm j,  t market F ,  is the 
estimated orthogonal component of the market portfolio, and t s ∆  is the percentage change in the real 
exchange rate over the same period.   Table 3 reports the number of firms with positive and negative 
significant exposure at 10% level of significance.  Newey-West consistent covariance matrix is estimated.     
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Fixed Flexible Fixed Flexible 
Mean 0.009  -0.066  -0.18  -0.25 
Median -0.13  -0.041  -0.27  -0.23 
Maximum  5.34  2.30 4.98 1.66 
Minimum  -2.64  -2.21 -2.85 -2.32 
Negative   64  13  72  31 
Positive   39  14  29  7 












Exchange Rate Exposure for Brazilian Companies 1996-2002 
Table 4 reports the mean, median, maximum, and minimum of companies￿ foreign exposure. Model 1 stands 
for the estimation of the equation:  jt t s j t market R j market j jt R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . , . , . Where Rjt is the monthly excess 
stock return of firm j,  t market R ,  is the market portfolio excess return (Ibovespa) and  t s ∆  is the percentage 
change in the real trade-weighted exchange rate over the same period. Model 2 stands for the estimation of 
jt t s j t market F j market j jt R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . , . ,   Where Rjt is the monthly stock return of firm j,  t market F ,  is the 
estimated orthogonal component of the market portfolio, and t s ∆  is the percentage change in the real trade 
weighted exchange rate over the same period.   Table 4 reports the number of firms with positive and 
negative significant exposure at 10% level of significance.  Newey-West consistent covariance matrix is 
estimated  
Model (1)  (2) 
Mean -0.19  -0.22 
Median -0.18  -0.20 
Maximum 2.36  2.28 
Minimum -3.82  -3.81 
Negative   35  39 
Positive   11  8 






Exchange Rate Exposure for Brazilian Companies and the Exchange rate regime 
Table 5 reports the mean, median, maximum, and minimum of companies￿ foreign exposure for two different 
periods. Fixed stands for the fixed exchange rate period from Jan.1996 to Oct. 1998. Flexible stands for the 
floating exchange rate regime from April.1999 to December 2002. Model 1 stands for the estimation of the 
equation:  jt t s j t market R j market j jt R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . , . , . Where Rjt is the monthly excess stock return of firm j, 
t market R ,  is the market portfolio excess return (Ibovespa) and  t s ∆  is the percentage change in the real trade 
weight exchange rate over the same period. Model 2 stands for the estimation of 
jt t s j t market F j market j jt R ε β β α + ∆ + + = . , . ,   Where Rjt is the monthly stock return of firm j,  t market F ,  is the 
estimated orthogonal component of the market portfolio, and t s ∆  is the percentage change in the real trade 
weight exchange rate over the same period.   Table 5 reports the number of firms with positive and negative 
significant exposure at 10% level of significance.  Newey-West consistent covariance matrix is estimated. 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Fixed Flexible Fixed Flexible 
Mean  -0.018 -0.24 -0.013 -0.28 
Median -0.24  -0.23  -0.20  -0.26 
Maximum 8.83  1.81  8.63  1.20 
Minimum -4.41  -4.93  -4.65  -5.02 
Negative   59  32  59  39 
Positive    39 6 36 5 











Table 6 provides summary statistics for the main determinants of companies￿ foreign exposure for the period 
from 1996 to 2002. The descriptions of the variables can be found in the appendix. Fixed stands for the 
mean of the variables under the fixed exchange rate regime, and flexible stands for the mean under the 
flexible exchange rate regime. T-test stands for a t-test for the equality of the means for the variables under 
the two exchange rate regimes. * means the test rejects the null that both means are equal. 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Fixed Flexible  T-test 
Total Assets (US$ 
millions) 
1,811 1,822 1,765 1,330 1,334 1,252 989  1,792 1,223  0.87(0.39) 
Total sales (US$ millions)  874 914 902 737 881 891 688 893  797  0.36(0.72) 
%  of  Exporters  60.6 61.6 62.8 62.8 62.8 63.4 63.4 61.6  63.0  -0.28(0.78)
Foreign Sales/Total Sales 
(%) 
14.7 14.5 14.4 16.0 15.9 16.6 17.9 14.6  16.7  -0.89(0.37)
%  of  Foreign  Debtors  83.5 82.3 85.9 82.3 80.5 80.5 81.1 83.8  80.9  0.79(0.43) 
Foreign  Debt/  Total  Debt  47.9 49.5 48.0 49.7 48.0 48.1 49.7 48.5  49.0  -0.13(0.89)




0.63 0.68 1.17 1.42 1.78 3.31 4.73 0.82  2.80  -
4.49(0.00)*
Short term Debt / Total 
debt (%) 




The Determinants of foreign currency exposure 
Table 7 shows the results of the estimation of the determinants of foreign currency exposure by weight least 
squares with the weight equals to the standard deviation of companies￿ exchange rate exposure estimated 
in the first step. The following equation was used in the estimation: 
i controls a Debt Total Debt Foreign a Assets Total s Derivative a Sales Total Sales Foreign a const i ε β + + + + + = . 4 )   /   .( 3 )   / .( 2 )   /   .( 1 . 
Where  i β are the foreign currency exposures estimated in table 2 .  *,** means significance at 5, and 10% . 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
Variable   Coefficient 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Constant -1.29(0.41)*  0.17(0.68)  -1.18(0.38)*  -0.19(0.63) 
Size (log Total Assets)  0.12(0.04)*  0.023(0.044)  0.088(0.033)* 0.020(0.041) 
Foreign Sales / Total sales  1.09(0.24)*  1.02(0.25)*  0.90 (0.22)*  0.82(0.23)* 
Derivatives / Total assets  0.50(0.14)*  0.44(0.19)*  0.37(0.16)*  0.34(0.18)** 
Foreign Debt / Total debt   -0.64(0.19)*  -0.63(0.14)*  -0.55(0.18)*  -0.54(0.17)* 
Control Variables        
Total Short term Debt / Total Debt     -0.74(0.28)*    -0.51(0.26)** 
Foreign Operations    -0.11(0.17)    -0.060(0.16) 
ADR   0.63(0.18)*    0.49(0.17)* 
Ownership   0.12(0.21)    0.14(0.19) 
        














Summary Statistics for Companies￿ Hedging Activities 
Table 8 reports firms￿ choice of hedging and the extent of their hedging activities from 1996 to 2002 to all 
firms in the sample. Foreign Assets include government bonds, and investment abroad. Currency 
Derivatives include the use of swaps, futures, and options.  
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of firms  165  165  165  165  165  165  165 
Only Foreign Currency Derivatives   10  12  18  22  27  35  41 
Only  Foreign  Assets  3  4 10  14 16 18 19 
Both  3  4  6 10 14 22 25 
Total  16 20 34 46 57  75  85 





The Choice of Currency Derivatives 
Table 9 shows the choice of currency derivatives among Brazilian companies reported in their annual 
reports from 1996 to 2002.  
Year  /  Type  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Swap  8  8  17 24 27 39 49 
Swap+Forwards  2 3 2 4 7  10  10 
Swap+Options  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Swap+Options+Forward  0 0 0 0 2 3 3 
Forward  3 3 3 2 4 4 3 
Options  0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Options+Forward  0 1 1 1 0 0 0 

























Table 10 shows the results for two-samples t-test of equality of means between users and non-users of 
foreign currency derivatives. Tests assume equal variances unless the null-hypothesis of equal variances is 
rejected at a 5% level of significance. Asterisks (*,**) denote statistical significance at 5%, and 10% level of 
significance.  
Variable/Year    1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 
No  152 149 141 133 124 108 99 
Number 
User  13 16 24 32 41 57  66 
No  0 0 0 0 0 0  0  Derivatives / Total 
Foreign Debt (%)  User  39.6 33.6 45.1 40.1 47.1 55.2  62.0 
No  0.27 0.30 0.53 0.96 1.00 1.22  1.16  Foreign Assets / Total 
Assets (%)  User  1.81** 2.05** 3.41* 3.12** 3.85* 3.89* 3.49* 
Size            
No  1,818 1,796 1,810 1,337 1,026 967 759  Total Assets 
(US$ Millions)  User  1,737 1,957 1,430 1,302 2,295 1,787 1,330 
Foreign Exposure            
No  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13  0.14  Foreign Sales / Total 
Sales  User  0.34* 0.30* 0.24** 0.25** 0.23** 0.23*  0.24* 
No  0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12  0.11  Foreign Operations 
Dummy  User  0.31 0.38** 0.29  0.25 0.27** 0.26*  0.26* 
No  0.46 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.40  0.39  Foreign Debt / Total 
Debt  User  0.72* 0.75* 0.72* 0.74* 0.71* 0.64*  0.66* 
Financial Distress            
No  0.55 0.51 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.53  0.55  Short term debt / 
Total debt  User  0.60 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.54  0.55 
No  5.65 4.23 4.18 3.24 4.51 4.57  4.00 
Interest Coverage 
User  2.87* 2.39* 2.60** 2.01  3.58  3.34 2.49 
Underinvestment            
No  0.10 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.10  0.11  Capital expenses-to-
sales   User  0.24 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.15  0.10 
No  0.76 0.91 0.70 1.28 0.40 0.69  1.32 
Market-to-book 
User  0.87 0.76 0.47 1.25 1.25* 0.63  1.30 
Other            
No  0.13 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07  0.08 
ADR Dummy 














Tobit results for the determinants of the use of Currency Derivatives 
Table 11 reports the results for the determinants of the use of currency derivatives under the fixed exchange 
rate regime and under the floating regime. Model (a) uses the ratio of the amount of currency derivatives to 
total foreign debt as the dependent variable. Model (b) uses the ratio of the amount of currency derivatives 
to total assets as the dependent variable. Asterisks (*,**) denote 5%, and 10% level of significance. Robust 
standard errors are estimated. 
  Fixed Exchange Rate  Floating Exchange Rate 
 (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
Variable Coeff.  Std. 
Error  Coeff.  Std. 
Error Coeff.  Std. 
Error  Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Intercept -0.075  1.27  -0.025  0.235 -3.814* 1.074  -0.650*  0.194 
Size  -0.077  0.092  -0.016 0.017 0.225* 0.079  0.0396* 0.0141
Foreign Sales / Total Sales  0.247  0.449  0.065  0.080 -0.033  0.410  -0.0435  0.075 
Foreign Debt / Total debt  1.01*  0.424  0.244*  0.079 0.386** 0.195  0.166*  0.055 
Foreign Operations Dummy  0.343  0.249  0.062  0.045 0.101  0.210  0.0085  0.038 
Short-Term Debt / Total debt  -0.567  0.488  -0.091  0.091 0.759*  0.321  0.0886  0.058 
Interest Coverage  -0.033  0.044  -0.004  0.008 -0.030  0.027  -0.012*  0.0056
Market-to-book ratio  -0.251  0.266  -0.042  0.041 -0.012  0.013  -0.0029  0.0024
Capital expenses/ Total 
sales  -0.067 0.470  -0.008  0.046 -0.308  0.587  -0.0499  0.110 
Foreign Assets / Total 
assets  0.397 1.722  0.032  0.312 0.655  1.223  0.072  0.217 
ADR 0.443**  0.261  0.085** 0.048 -0.0233 0.243  0.017  0.044 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  165 165  165  165 
Left Censored  140 140  97  140 

























 Results for the determinants of the use of Currency Derivatives ￿ Two-stage procedure 
Table 12 reports the results for the determinants of the use of currency derivatives under the fixed exchange 
rate regime and under the floating regime. Model (a) uses the ratio of the amount of currency derivatives to 
total foreign debt as the dependent variable. Model (b) uses the ratio of the amount of currency derivatives 
to total assets as the dependent variable. Asterisks (*,**) denote 5%, and 10% level of significance. Robust 
standard error are estimated. 
  Fixed Exchange Rate  Floating Exchange Rate 
 (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
Variable Coeff.  Std. 
Error  Coeff. Std. 
Error Coeff. Std. 
Error  Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Intercept 2.44  2.09  0.37  0.40  -2.96* 1.19  -0.47*  0.22 
Size  -0.28  0.19  -0.05 0.04 0.15 0.10 0.022 0.018 
Foreign Sales / Total Sales  -0.25  0.57  -0.022 0.11  -0.46  0.52  -0.13  0.10 
Foreign Debt / Total debt  2.68**  1.48  0.49** 0.29  1.23** 0.70  0.32*  0.14 
Foreign  Operations  Dummy  0.32  0.25  0.06 0.05 0.07 0.21  0.05  0.40 
Short-Term Debt / Total debt  -0.34  0.43  -0.04  0.08  0.82*  0.31  0.10**  0.05 
Interest Coverage  -0.009  0.40  0.006  0.007 -0.02  0.03  -0.008  0.005 
Market-to-book ratio  -0.23  0.22  -0.04  0.04  -0.013 0.013  -0.003  0.002 
Capital expenses/ Total 
sales 
0.040  0.20  0.01 0.04 0.06 0.61  0.03  0.12 
Foreign Assets / Total 
assets  0.29  1.54  0.07 0.30 0.57 1.20  0.10  0.22 
Foreign Equity Listing  0.45**  0.26  0.08** 0.05  0.009  0.24  0.02  0.05 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 

























Logit results for the determinants of the use of Currency Derivatives 
Table 13 reports the results for the determinants of the use of currency derivatives under the fixed exchange 
rate regime and under the floating regime. The dependent variable assumes the value 1 if the firms used 
currency derivatives, and 0 otherwise. All variables are measure in 1998 (2002). Asterisks (*,**) denote 5%, 
and 10% level of significance. Robust standard errors are estimated. 
  Fixed Exchange Rate Flexible Exchange Rate 
Variable Coeff.  Std. 
Error  Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
Intercept 0.559  4.012  -9.568*  2.578 
Size  -0.344  0.287 0.624* 0.184 
Foreign Sales / Total Sales  0.903  1.657  1.180  1.037 
Foreign Debt / Total debt  3.832*  1.199  1.483*  0.676 
Foreign  Operations  Dummy  1.190  0.862 0.184 0.550 
Short-Term Debt / Total debt -2.175  1.897  1.240*  0.682 
Interest  Coverage  -0.111  0.110 -0.105 0.069 
Market-to-book ratio  -0.435  0.546  -0.0326  0.025 
Capital expenses/ Total 
sales  -0.123  0.306 -0.456 0.969 
Foreign Assets / Total 
assets  4.352  5.267 1.870 3.589 
Foreign Equity Listing  1.519*  0.907  -0.447  0.638 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes 




























Exchange Rate Regimes and the existence of implicit guarantees 
Table 14 reports the results for the test of the relation between companies￿ financial policies and the 
exchange rate regime. The dependent variable is the ratio of foreign debt to total debt in 1998(2002).   
Independent variables are for 1997(2001). Asterisks (*,**) denote 5%, and 10% level of significance. Tobit 
estimation is performed. Robust Standard errors are in parenthesis. F-Statistic is reported for the test of 
equality of the coefficients of ratio of foreign sales and domestic sales to total debt. 
  Fixed Exchange Rate  Floating Exchange Rate 
Variable Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
Intercept -0.55(0.13)*  -0.70(0.17)*  -0.060(0.14)  -0.13(0.21) 
Size 0.047(0.010)*  0.059(0.014)*  0.010(0.011)  0.012(0.015) 
(Foreign debt/total Debt)t-1 0.81(0.052)*  0.79(0.06)*  0.89(0.07)*  0.86(0.071)* 
Foreign Sales/ Total Debt  0.013(0.010)  0.014(0.011)  0.012(0.004)*  0.013(0.004)* 
Domestic Sales/Total debt  -0.00009(0.0001)  -0.0008(0.0001)  -0.007(0.002)*  -0.007(0.002)* 
ADR Dummy  -  -0.036(0.050)  -  -0.013(0.06) 
Capital Expenses/Total 
Sales  - -0.07(0.094) - -0.19(0.13) 
Industry  Dummies  No Yes No Yes 
F-Statistic 1.69  1.56  14.02  14.43 
Prob>F 0.196  0.213  0.003  0.002 
N 165  165  165  165 
Left  Censored 24 24 31 31 
































•  ADR - Dummy variable assumes the value of 1 if the company issues 
American depository receipts.   
•  Current ratio - the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.   
•  Debt-to-assets - Total Debt in Reais divided by total assets.  
•  Exchange rate volatility - The standard deviation of monthly percent 
changes in the nominal exchange rate Real versus US\$. Source: Central 
bank of Brazil   
•  Interest rate volatility - The standard deviation of the SELIC rate. Source: 
Brazilian Central Bank.   
•  Domestic Sales / Total Sales - Total net sales in Reais divided by total 
sales.  
•  Domestic Sales / Total Debt -Domestic sales in Reais divided by the total 
debt expressed in Reais.   
•  Foreign Assets ￿ The sum of government bonds (NTN-E), Central Bank 
bonds (NBC-E), and financial investments abroad expressed in US$, and 
converted in Reais. 
•  Foreign Debt / Total Debt - Foreign debt in US\$ converted to Reais by the 
exchange rate at the end of the year divided by the total debt expressed in 
Reais.  
•  Foreign Sales / Total debt -Foreign sales in US\$ converted to Reais by 
the exchange rate at the end of the year divided by the total debt 
expressed in Reais.   
•  Foreign Sales / Total sales -Foreign sales in US\$ converted to Reais by 
the exchange rate at the end of the year divided by the total sales 
expressed in Reais.   
•  Foreign Operations - dummy variable assumes the value 1 if the company 
has foreign production subsidiaries.   
•  Investment-to-sales - Total investment in capital, and subsidiaries divided 
by total net sales.   
•  Gross Margin - Total calculated EBIT divided by sales.   
•  Debt - Dummy variable assumes the value 1 if the firm issued debt in 
foreign currency.   
•  Derivatives / Foreign debt - Proportion of foreign debt hedged by the use 
of derivatives.   





                                                 
24 If not mentioned, the data was obtained directly from companies’ annual reports. 